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1. Introduction 
Crude oil can be regarded perhaps as the most important commodity given its influential 
role in the world economy relative to other commodities, particularly in terms of its causal 
effects on recessions (Hamilton, 1983, 2008, 2009, 2013; Elder and Serletis, 2010) and 
inflation (Stock and Watson, 2003). Additionally, oil is indispensable for the industrial, 
transportation, and agricultural sectors, whether used as feedstock in production or as a surface 
fuel in consumption (Mensi, et al., 2014). Consequently, there is a vast literature on the oil-
stock market relationship, suggesting that oil price shocks significantly impact stock returns 
and that these shocks contain information that can be transmitted to the stock market (see e.g. 
Jones and Kaul, 1996; Sadorsky, 1999; Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez, 2005; Basher and 
Sadorsky, 2006; Driesprong et al., 2008; Nandha and Faff, 2008; Apergis and Miller, 2009; 
Kilian and Park, 2009; Miller and Ratti, 2009; Chen, 2010; Arouri and Rault, 2011; Basher, 
Haug, and Sadorsky, 2012; Cunado and Perez De Gracia, 2014; and Alsalman and Herrera, 
2015). From an economic perspective, given the intricate relationship between the real 
economy and financial markets through expectations of cash flows and profitability of firms, 
one can argue that the effect of oil price shocks on the stock market is partially driven by the 
increased uncertainty in real economic activity, which in turn reduces investment, consumption 
and aggregate production (see Elder and Serletis, 2010 and Jo, 2014). 
In another strand of the literature, however, motivated by the failure of theoretical pricing 
models to replicate the level, volatility and countercylicality of equity risk premia, a growing 
body of work has focused on time-varying disaster risks as a factor that can explain the high 
excess returns and volatility observed in the stock market. Following the early work of Rietz 
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(1988), a number of theoretical and empirical papers have recently provided evidence of the 
predictive power of rare disaster risks for excess returns and volatility in financial markets (see 
for example, Barro, 2006, 2009; Gourio, 2008a, b, 2012; Barro and Ursúa, 2008, 2009, 2012; 
Barro and Jin, 2011;  Berkman et al., 2011, 2017; Gabaix, 2012; Nakamura et al., 2013; 
Wachter 2013; Farhi and Gabaix, 2016; Manela and Moreira, 2017). While Gourio (2012) 
argues that an increase in the probability of a disaster creates a collapse of investment and 
consequently drives the risk of a recession, Wachter (2013) relates the time-varying risk of rare 
disasters to consumption shocks, which in turn drives excess returns and volatility in the stock 
market. Similarly, Gabaix (2012) proposes a model that combines time-variation in the 
probability of a rare disaster with time-variation in the degree to which dividends respond to a 
disaster in order to explain the excess volatility puzzle in stock returns. Similarly, using global 
political instability as a proxy for rare disaster risk, Berkman et al. (2017) document a positive 
intertemporal relation between disaster probability and the market risk premium. Further 
focusing on asset pricing implications, Berkman et al. (2011) show that time-varying rare 
disaster risks are also priced in the cross-section of stock returns, implied by higher returns 
observed for industries that are more crisis risk sensitive. 
Given the overwhelming evidence on the stock-oil market relationship as well as a 
significant effect of disaster risks on stock market excess returns and volatility, a natural 
research question is whether such a relationship exists between time-varying disaster risks and 
oil return dynamics. Following the arguments of Barro, (2006, 2009), Gourio (2012), and 
Wachter (2013), if uncertainty regarding the probability and size of disasters leads to a great 
deal of uncertainty in terms of investment growth or consumption patterns, then considering 
the suggestion by Bernanke (2016) that both oil and stock markets tend to move together as 
they both react to a common factor reflecting global aggregate demand, one obvious channel 
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that links disaster risks to oil market movements is the potential effect of rare disasters on 
growth expectations for both output and consumption.  
A second channel through which disaster risks can affect oil return dynamics is via its 
contribution to jump risk in oil prices. While the presence of jump risk driving stock and bond 
returns is well documented in the literature (e.g. Maheu and McCurdy, 2004; Dunham and 
Friesen, 2007; Huang and Tauchen, 2005; Maheu et al. 2013 and Guo et al., 2016), there is 
growing evidence suggesting that jumps account for a large part of the variation in crude oil 
prices and a substantial part of the risk premium in oil derivatives prices as a result of jumps 
(e.g. Larsson and Nossman, 2011; Christoffersen et al., 2016; Baum and Zerilli, 2016). In the 
context of stock returns, Wachter (2013) relates time-varying disaster probabilities to large 
instantaneous changes, i.e. jumps, in aggregate consumption. Suggesting that the equity market 
premium is partially driven by the comovement of agents’ marginal utility and the price process 
for stocks in times of disaster (i.e. jump risk), Wachter (2013) shows mathematically that time-
varying disaster risk contributes to the equity premium in the form of compensation for jump 
risk. Given this perspective, one can argue that time-varying rare disaster risks also contribute 
to the presence of jumps in oil excess returns in the form of a compensation for consumption 
shocks such that an increase in the risk of rare disasters increases return and volatility in the oil 
market. To that end, the analysis can provide insight to the effect of oil price shocks on stock 
market returns and volatility from a novel angle. 
The goal of this paper is to examine the predictive power of rare disaster-risks for the 
return and volatility dynamics of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil prices using a long span 
of historical data over the period 1918:01-2013:12. In the process, we contribute to the 
literature on rare disaster risks and financial markets from a commodity market perspective by 
focusing on crude oil. To that end, given the evidence in Berkman et al. (2011) that industries 
that are more sensitive to crisis risks yield higher returns, our direct focus on crude oil can 
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provide valuable insights as to whether the crisis risk premium on particular industries are 
channelled via their sensitivity to oil price fluctuations. Furthermore, knowledge of the factors 
(in this case, rare disaster risks) that drive oil market returns and volatility is likely to constitute 
valuable information for economic agents including those who price and trade derivatives 
contracts underlying energy assets. 
To achieve our objective, we conduct predictability analysis based on the k-th order 
nonparametric causality-in-quantiles test recently developed by Balcilar et al. (2016a). This 
test studies higher order causality over the entire conditional distribution and is inherently 
based on a nonlinear dependence structure between the variables, as captured by data-driven 
nonparametric functions. The nonparametric causality-in-quantiles test of Balcilar et al. 
(2016a) combines elements of the test for nonlinear causality of k-th order developed by 
Nishiyama et al. (2011) with the causality-in-quantiles test developed by Jeong et al. (2012) 
and, hence, can be considered to be a generalization of the former. The causality-in-quantile 
approach has the following three novelties: Firstly, it is robust to misspecification errors as it 
detects the underlying dependence structure between the examined time series, which could 
prove to be particularly important as it is well known that oil returns display nonlinear 
dynamics (Balcilar et al., (2016a)) – something that we show to be the case formally via 
statistical tests in our case as well. Secondly, via this methodology, we are able to test not only 
for causality-in-mean (1st moment), but also for causality that may exist in the tails of the joint 
distribution of the variables, which in turn, is important if the dependent variable has fat-tails 
– a feature we show below to hold for oil returns. Finally, we are also able to investigate 
causality-in-variance and, thus, study impact on volatility. Such an investigation is imporant 
because, during some periods, causality in the conditional-mean may not exist while, at the 
same time, higher-order interdependencies may turn out to be significant. 
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Note that, other standard nonlinear causality tests (for example, Hiemstra and Jones 
(1994), and Diks and Panchenko (2005, 2006)) and GARCH models could have also been used 
to analyze the impact of disaster risks on oil returns and/or volatility, but these approaches rely 
on conditional-mean based estimation, and hence fail to capture the entire conditional 
distribution of oil returns and volatility – something we can do with our approach. In the 
process, our test is a more general procedure of detecting causality in both returns and volatility 
simultaneously at each point of the respective conditional distributions. Hence, we are able to 
capture existence or non-existence of causality at various phases (bear (lower quantiles), 
normal (median) and bull (upper quantiles)) of the oil market. Being a more general test, our 
method is more likely to pick up causality when conditional mean-based tests might fail to do 
so.  In addition, since we do not need decide on the number of regimes as in a Markov-switching 
model, and can test for causality at each point of the conditional distribution characterizing 
specific regimes, our test also does not suffer from any misspecification in terms of specifying 
and testing for the optimal the number of regimes. Finally, the volatility process and its 
relationship with the disaster risks, based on GARCH models, would be model contingent 
depending upon which model of the GARCH family we use and would not be model-free as in 
our nonparametric approach, where the relationship between, returns and volatility with 
disaster risks is purely data-driven.      
Given the argument by Wachter (2013) that time-varying disaster risks contribute to 
excess returns and volatility in the form of a jump component in the price process, the 
nonparametric causality tests that we employ in our empirical tests provide an appropriate 
approach as it allows us to test for the impact of disaster risks on both oil returns and volatility, 
while accounting for possible nonlinearities in the relationship between oil market movements 
and changes in disaster probabilities. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that 
evaluates the predictive power of rare disaster risks for crude oil returns and volatility based 
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on a nonparametric causality-in-quantiles framework. Consistent with the evidence for the 
stock market, we show that rare disaster risk proxies strongly predict both returns and volatility 
for oil, with stronger causal effects observed at the lower ends of their respective conditional 
distributions, suggesting that rare disaster risks potentially contribute to jump risk in oil returns. 
The findings also suggest that the effect of oil price shocks on stock market return dynamics 
could partially be channelled via the time-variation in disaster risk probabilities that commonly 
affects both the stock and oil price processes. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the econometric 
frameworks involving the higher-moment nonparametric causality-in-quantiles test, and the 
(GARCH-based) measure of volatility. Section 3 presents the data and discusses the empirical 
results. Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
2. Econometric Framework 
In this section, we briefly present the methodology for the detection of nonlinear causality 
via a hybrid approach as developed by Balcilar et al. (2016a), which in turn is based on the 
frameworks of Nishiyama et al. (2011) and Jeong et al. (2012). We start by denoting oil returns 
by yt and the predictor variable (in our case, the dummies capturing various types of rare 
disaster risk-related events- discussed in detail in the next section) as xt. We further let 
),...,( 11 pttt yyY −−− ≡ , ),...,( 11 pttt xxX −−− ≡ , ),( ttt YXZ =  and ),( 1| 1 −− ttZy ZyF tt  and 
),( 1| 1 −− ttYy YyF tt  denote the conditional distribution functions of ty  given 1−tZ  and 1−tY , 
respectively. If we let denote )|()( 11 −− ≡ ttt ZyQZQ θθ  and )|()( 11 −− ≡ ttt YyQYQ θθ , we have 
θθ =−−− }|)({ 11| 1 ttZy ZZQF tt  with probability one. As a result, the (non)causality in the -th 
quantile hypotheses to be tested are: 
                                ,    (1) 
                                .   (2) 
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Jeong et al. (2012) use the distance measure )}()|({ 11 −−= tzttt ZfZEJ εε , where tε  is the 
regression error term and )( 1−tz Zf  is the marginal density function of 1−tZ . The regression error 
tε  emerges based on the null hypothesis in (1), which can only be true if and only if 
θθ =≤ −− }]|)({1[ 11 ttt ZYQyE  or, expressed in a different way, ttt YQy εθθ +=≤ − )}({1 1 , where 
 is the indicator function. Jeong et al. (2012) show that the feasible kernel-based sample 
analogue of J  has the following format: 
                                .   (3) 
where )(⋅K  is the kernel function with bandwidth h , 𝑇𝑇 is the sample size, 𝑝𝑝 is the lag order, 
and is the estimate of the unknown regression error, which is given by 
                                                .   (4) 
)(ˆ 1−tYQθ  is an estimate of the θ th conditional quantile of ty  given 1−tY , and we estimate  
)(ˆ 1−tYQθ  using the nonparametric kernel method as 
                                                )|(ˆ)(ˆ 1
1
|1 1 −
−
− −
= tYyt YFYQ tt θθ ,   (5) 
where )|(ˆ 1| 1 −− ttYy YyF tt  is the Nadarya-Watson kernel estimator given by 
                ,       (6) 
with )(⋅L  denoting the kernel function and h  the bandwidth.  
As an extension of Jeong et al. (2012)'s framework, Balcilar et al. (2016a) develop a 
test for the second moment which allows to test the causality between the various disaster risk-
related dummies and oil return volatility. Adapting the approach in Nishiyama et al. (2011), 
higher order quantile causality can be specified in terms of the following hypotheses as: 
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         for Kk ,...,2,1=             (7) 
         for Kk ,...,2,1=             (8) 
We can integrate the entire framework and test whether tx  Granger causes ty  in 
quantile θ  up to the kth moment using Eq. (7) to construct the test statistic in Eq. (6) for each 
k . The causality-in-variance test can then be calculated by replacing in Eqs. (3) and (4) with 
- measuring the volatility of oil returns. However, one can show that it is difficult to combine 
the different statistics for each Kk ,...,2,1=  into one statistic for the joint null in Eq. (7) because 
the statistics are mutually correlated (Nishiyama et al., 2011). Balcilar et al. (2016a), thus, 
propose a sequential-testing method as described in Nishiyama et al. (2011). First, as in Balcilar 
et al. (2016a), we test for the nonparametric Granger causality in the first moment )1 ..( =kei . 
Nevertheless, failure to reject the null for 1=k  does not automatically lead to no-causality in 
the second moment. Thus, we can still construct the test for 2=k , as discussed in detail in 
Balcilar et al. (2016a).  
The empirical implementation of causality testing via quantiles entails specifying three 
key parameters: the bandwidth h , the lag order p , and the kernel type for )(⋅K  and )(⋅L . We 
use a lag order based on the Schwarz information criterion (SIC), which is known to select a 
parsimonious model as compared with other lag-length selection criteria. The SIC criterion 
helps to overcome the issue of the over-parameterization that typically arises in studies using 
nonparametric frameworks. For each quantile, we determine the bandwidth parameter (h) by 
using the leave-one-out least-squares cross validation method. Finally, for 𝐾𝐾(∙) and 𝐿𝐿(∙), we 
use Gaussian kernels. 
Given the evidence in Sadorsky (2006) that a GARCH(1,1) model fits very well with 
crude oil price volatility, we also decided to check for the robustness of our results in terms of 
volatility. Hence, we first recover a measure of conditional volatility from a GARCH(1,1) 
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model and then apply the causality-in-quantiles test to this measure of volatility. The basics of 
GARCH(1,1) model is as follows: 
  𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝜇𝜇 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡,                                                                                                                (9)                              
ℎ𝑡𝑡 = 𝜔𝜔 + 𝛼𝛼𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−12 + 𝛽𝛽ℎ𝑡𝑡−1,                                                                                           (10)                               
where 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 represents the oil returns series and 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 is the stochastic disturbance term that is 
assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean. The conditional variance ℎ𝑡𝑡 depends on 
the mean volatility level (𝜔𝜔), the lagged error (𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−12 ), and the lagged conditional variance 
(ℎ𝑡𝑡−1).  
3. Data 
The empirical analysis utilizes monthly data for WTI oil prices and the dummy variables 
capturing various types of disaster risks over the period of 1918:01 to 2013:12. The start and 
end dates are governed purely by the availability of data on disaster risks. Oil price data is 
sourced from the Global Financial Database, with returns computed as the monthly logarithmic 
change of oil prices multiplied by 100 to convert the returns into percentages. Since WTI oil 
price data is available from 1859:09, we do not lose the first observation while computing oil 
returns. Figures 1(a) and 1(b) present the plot of monthly oil returns and the histogram of the 
series along with the summary statistics, respectively. We observe that the oil return data is 
skewed to the left with excess kurtosis, resulting in the null of normality under the Jarque-Bera 
test being overwhelmingly rejected at the highest level of significance. The non-normal 
distribution, in turn, provides preliminary motivation for relying on a quantiles-based approach 
for our analysis.  
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
Next we turn our attention to our measure of disaster risks of rare events as obtained from the 
International Crisis Behavior (ICB) database. ICB database started in 1975 and covers 
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comprehensive information regarding 464 international political crises that occurred during the 
period of 1918 to 2013 at monthly frequency, involving 1,036 crisis actors. Brecher and 
Wilkenfeld (1997) provide detail discussion on the ICB database, definition and construction 
of variables. The ICB data has been used in series of books and empirical research papers in 
many disciplines, including economics, war and political sciences (see for example, Blomberg, 
et al., (2004); Berkman, et al., (2011, 2017); Huang et al., (2015))1. The underlying motive of 
the ICB database is to develop a comprehensive list of international political crisis since World 
War I. As per the ICB database, the breakpoint of a crisis is an event, act or changes 
characterized by following three conditions: (a) a threat to basic value, (b) excessive chances 
of involvement in military hostilities, and (c) time pressure for response. ICB database covers 
a wide range of alternatives to measure the severity of any crisis and, consequently gives us 
more information to identify the seriousness of the crisis. Note that, to the best of our 
knowledge, the ICB database is the only available source that compiles data on all major 
international international political crises, which are likely to cause changes in perceived rare 
disaster probabilities. 
The ICB database distinguishes each crisis on the basis of 81 dimensions including the control 
variables and crisis mediation, with the possibility of tracing the background of each crisis in 
detail from the website of ICB database. Further, the ICB database considers those crises only 
in which the crisis actor is a sovereign entity and has significant participation in any of political 
conflict. As indicated above, the ICB database covers comprehensive dimensions of each crisis 
and we take into account many of these dimensions, following Berkman, et al., (2011, 2017), 
to analyze the impact of international political risk on oil returns and volatility. The foremost 
variable of our study is total number of crisis (Crisis) in any month t. Some crisis can be more 
severe than others, therefore it is expected that more devastating crisis may have stronger 
                                                          
1 The ICB web site (https://sites.duke.edu/icbdata/) provides an overview of studies that used its data. 
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effect. Following the Berkman, et al., (2011, 2017), we created the following crisis variables: 
(1) violent break (Violent Break) includes all the crisis that starts with violent act, (2) violent 
(Violent) crisis includes all the crisis that comprises either serious clashes or full scale war, (3) 
war (War) includes all the crisis that involves full-scale wars, (4) all crisis that involves grave 
value threats (Grave Threat), (5) protracted conflicts (Protracted) includes all the crisis with 
protracted conflict, protracted and crisis outside this conflict, and (6) major power (Major 
Power) includes the crisis only if at least one superpower or great power is there in both side 
of conflict. Finally, we also construct a crisis severity index (Crisis Severity Index) that 
summarizes different aspects of crisis severity into one measure by aggregating the six 
variables above. Figure 1(c) plots the various rare disaster risks used in this paper.   
For all the above crisis variables, we created the dummy variables, which is equal to 1 if the 
crisis in that group occurs in a specific month, and zero otherwise. The dummy variables are 
normalized to have a mean of zero and variance of unity, so that we can compare the strength 
of predictability across the various disaster risks. In other words, we also want to understand, 
which type of disaster risks carry more information in predicting oil returns and volatility. 
When the predictors, in our case the dummy variables, have been standardized (i.e., their 
inherent variability is the same), the higher the test statistic indicating a stronger rejection of 
the null hypothesis of no-causality, the stronger is the predictability of that particular disaster 
risk variable. Hence, via this normalization, we not only want to analyze whether the disaster 
risks can predict oil returns and volatility, but also which disaster risk is comparatively more 
informative in this regard. 
4. Empirical Findings 
Before we begin our discussion of the findings from the causality-in-quantiles tests, for the 
sake of completeness and comparability, we first provide the findings from the standard linear 
Granger causality tests with null hypothesis that a specific rare disaster risk does not affect oil 
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returns. As shown in Table 1, the standard linear Granger causality tests yield no evidence of 
causality that goes from any of the disaster risk variables to oil returns. Therefore, standard 
linear tests imply no significant causal relationships between rare disaster risks and oil returns. 
[Insert Table 1] 
Given the insignificant results obtained from linear causality tests, next we statistically 
examine the presence of nonlinearity in the relationship between oil returns and the predictor 
variables representing rare disaster risks. For this purpose, we apply the Brock et al., (1996, 
BDS) test on the residuals from the return equation used in the linear causality tests involving 
the rare disaster risk dummies. The results of the BDS test of nonlinearity presented in Table 2 
provide strong evidence of rejection of the null hypothesis of i.i.d. residuals at various 
embedded dimensions (𝑚𝑚). Thus, we conclude that there exists nonlinearity in the relationship 
between oil returns and the rare disaster risk dummies. This evidence also indicates that the 
findings based on the linear Granger causality test as presented in Table 1 cannot be deemed 
robust and reliable.  
In addition to the BDS test, we also apply the Bai and Perron (2003) tests of multiple 
structural breaks on the oil return equation used to test linear Granger causality based on the 
various types of disaster risks. Using the powerful UDmax and WDmax tests, and allowing for 
a maximum of five breaks with fifteen percent endpoint trimming as well as heterogeneous 
error distributions across breaks, we detect three breaks (1941:07, 1971:12, and 1986: 04) in 
all cases.2 The presence of these breaks further confirms our earlier findings, based on 
nonlinearity tests, that the linear model is misspecified.  
Given the strong evidence of nonlinearity and regime changes in the relationship 
between oil returns and the crises dummies, we now turn our attention to the causality-in-
                                                          
2 Complete details of the Bai and Perron (2003) tests of structural breaks are available upon request from the 
authors. 
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quantiles test, which is robust to possible misspecification due to nonlinearity and structural 
breaks given its nonparametric (i.e. data-driven) structure.  
[Insert Table 2] 
Table 3 presents the findings from the causality-in-quantiles tests estimated over the 
quantile range from 0.10 to 0.90. Panels A and B present the findings for WTI oil returns and 
volatility (squared returns) respectively and the null hypothesis is that rare disaster risk 
dummies (in columns) do not Granger cause oil returns and volatility. Unlike the insignificant 
findings from linear tests reported in Table 1, we observe in Table 3 that the null is consistently 
rejected, implying strong evidence of predictability running from all the various disaster risks 
dummies to both returns and volatility in the oil market. These findings are in line with the 
evidence for stock market returns in Barro (2006, 2009), Gourio (2008a, b, 2012), Berkman et 
al. (2011, 2017), Gabaix (2012), among others and suggest that disaster probabilities associated 
with consumption and/or investment shocks commonly affect stock and oil price processes. 
Interestingly however, we see that causality is particularly strong at the lower end of the 
respective conditional distributions, while the strongest effect on volatility is observed at 
quantile of 0.10 with the same observed at the quantile of 0.30 in the case of oil return. We also 
see that this pattern is consistent across the various disaster risk proxies. These findings suggest 
that, while the predictive power of rare disaster risks over oil market dynamics is statistically 
significant for the entire conditional distributions of returns and volatility, the causal effect is 
strongest when the returns and volatility are in the lowest quantile, corresponding to negative 
oil returns coupled with low return volatility. It can thus be argued that rare disaster risks relate 
to negative jumps, i.e. large instantaneous changes, in oil prices (implied by lower quantiles), 
while these jumps are not necessarily associated with high volatility, possibly due to lower 
trading activity or other factors driving investor behaviour. The high degree of nonlinearity in 
the relationship between time varying disaster risks and oil return dynamics reported in Table 
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3 is in line with the model for an endowment economy proposed by Weitzman (2007) based 
on non-normal consumption growth rate such that the conditional distribution of consumption 
growth becomes highly non-normal when a disaster is relatively likely. To that end, the 
findings imply that the effect of disaster risks on oil return dynamics is primarily channeled via 
aggregate consumption shocks in the economy. 
Furthermore, the high degree of causality particularly at the lower end of the conditional 
distributions for oil return and volatility supports Wachter (2013)’s mixed jump-diffusion 
process for consumption growth in which disasters are captured by a Poisson process, which 
allows for large instantaneous changes, i.e. jumps, in aggregate consumption. Maheu et al. 
(2013) define jumps as large changes in daily returns. Similarly, Wachter (2013) models jumps 
as large instantaneous changes in the price process and shows that excess stock returns are 
partially driven by a jump component that is due to the time variation in disaster risks. Recently, 
Guo et al. (2016) decompose the jump component of realized stock market volatility to negative 
(bad) and positive (good) jumps and show that jump risk has asymmetric effects on the 
conditional stock market excess returns. Given that our focus is oil returns and volatility, we 
refrain from labelling positive and negative jumps in the oil price process as good or bad jumps; 
however, capture this asymmetry via the quantile specification in our tests. Nevertheless, our 
findings point to an asymmetry in the effect of time varying disasters risks on jumps in oil 
returns and volatility. Given the finding by Larsson and Nossman (2011) that jumps are an 
essential factor needed to correctly capture the time series properties of oil prices, our findings 
have significant implications for hedging and the pricing of oil derivatives. 
 
 [Insert Table 3] 
In order to further confirm the causal effects of rare disaster risks on oil return volatility, 
we present in Table 4, the findings for the tests of causality from the disaster risk dummies to 
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the conditional volatility estimates obtained from the GARCH(1,1) model discussed earlier. 
Again, barring three individual exceptions (i.e. the quantile of 0.60 and 0.50-0.60 for ‘War’ 
and ‘Grave Threat’, respectively), we observe strong evidence of predictability for the 
GARCH-based volatility measures emanating from the rare disaster risk dummies. As observed 
for squared returns in Table 3, we see again that the dummy capturing all possible crises tends 
to be the strongest predictor, consistently at all quantiles. However, unlike the findings reported 
in Table 3, we see that the causal effects are not necessarily the strongest at lower quantiles of 
the respective conditional distributions. It must, however, be noted that Balcilar et al. (2016b) 
suggests that one should rely on the results obtained under squared returns as a measure of 
volatility, rather than a model-based measure of the same, since the analysis for the squared 
returns follows directly from the k-th order test of nonparametric causality-in-quantiles.  
[Insert Table 4] 
As explained earlier in the data description, the findings reported in Tables 3 and 4 utilize 
dummy variables that represent various definitions of rare disaster risks. In addition to these 
dummy variables, the ICB dataset also provides the monthly count for the risk variables under 
the various categories as well as information on their start and end dates, i.e. the span of the 
crisis. Therefore, as a robustness check, we repeat our analysis using the monthly counts for 
various risk categories instead. The findings in Table 5 further confirm our previous results in 
Table 3 that are based on the crisis dummy variables, indicating strong evidence of 
predictability for both oil returns and volatility over the entirety of the respective conditional 
distributions. The causal effects from rare disaster risks are found to be significant irrespective 
of what phase the month is classified as, i.e. start, end and duration of the crisis. Furthermore, 
we observe that the pattern of the strength of the causal relationship with the count data is 
similar to that observed when the dummies are used as predictors, along with the importance 
of the predictive ability of the predictor variable capturing all the crises. In short, our findings 
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yield significant evidence of a causal relationship between rare disaster risks and oil return and 
volatility with the effect being particularly strong at low quantiles of the conditional 
distribution representing periods of negative oil returns. 
[Insert Table 5] 
As additional robustness checks, we also used the news-based measures of implied 
volatility (NVIX) as developed by Manela and Moreira (2017)3 and geopolitical risks (GPRs) 
of Caldara and Iacoviello (2017)4, as possible alternative measures of rare disaster risks. The 
NVIX and the GPRs indexes also contain information about possible disaster risks (see, 
Footnotes 3 and 4 respectively in this regard) and hence, serves as an alternative to the ICB 
database. The NVIX and the GPRs are used to check for the robustness of our results obtained 
using the ICB database, which in turn, is popularly used for capturing rare disaster risks in the 
associated literature. Even though the NVIX and GPR indexes are based on news on various 
types of risks in the US newspapers, they do cover global disaster news as well and hence, is 
likely to be important for a global market like oil. Also note, since we are analyzing the WTI 
market, US-based risks should also matter, besides global disaster risks, which the ICB aims 
to capture.     
                                                          
3 The news dataset to construct the NVIX includes the title and abstract of all front-page articles of the Wall Street 
Journal. Manela and Moreira (2017) focus on front-page titles and abstracts in order to ensure feasibility of data 
collection, and also because these are manually edited and corrected following optical character recognition, 
which in turn, improves their earlier sample reliability. The NVIX data is found to peak during stock market 
crashes, times of policy-related uncertainty, world wars, and financial crises. The reader is referred to Manela and 
Moreira (2017) for further details, who also discuss how they decompose the aggregate NVIX into its components. 
The NVIX components capture uncertainty stemming from (with the words searched for in 
brackets) government policy (tax, money, rates, government, plan), intermediation (banks, financial, business, 
bank, credit), natural disaster (fire, storm, aids, happening, shock), securities markets/stock markets (stock, 
market, stocks, industry, markets), and wars (war, military, action,world war, violence). There is also available 
data for an “unclassified” component (U.S., special, Washington, treasury, gold). The data is available for 
download from: http://apps.olin.wustl.edu/faculty/manela/data.html.  
4 Caladara and Iacoviello (2017) construct a long-span monthly GPR index dating back to 1899, based on terms 
related to geopolitical risks covered in three newspapers namely, the New York Times, Chicago Tribune, and the 
Washington Post. The phrases considered for constructing the index are: “geopolitical risk(s)", “geopolitical 
concern(s)", “geopolitical tension(s)", “geopolitical uncertainty(ies)", “N/3” (“crisis” OR “uncertain”)), “war 
risk(s)" (OR “risk(s) of war"), state of war” OR “declaration of war”, “war” OR “military” and “military threat(s)", 
“terrorist threat(s)", “terrorist act(s)", “Middle East AND tensions". The data can be downloaded from: 
https://www2.bc.edu/matteo-iacoviello/gpr.htm.  
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As can be seen from the results reported in Tables A1 (covering the period of 1889:07 
to 2016:03) and A2 (over the period of 1899:01 to 2017:06) in the Appendix of the paper, there 
is strong evidence of predictability for oil returns and volatility (squared returns) due to 
aggregate measures of NVIX and GPR and their respective components, (i.e., uncertainty 
associated with government policy, intermediation, natural disaster, securities markets, war and 
unclassified events under the NVIX, and GPR acts and GPR threats under GPRs) respectively. 
Note that, the pattern associated with strength of causality is similar to those reported for the 
rare-disaster risks. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper extends the literature on the effect of rare disaster risks on financial market returns 
to the commodity market, in particular crude oil. Unlike other applications to stock and bond 
returns, we provide a novel perspective to the predictive ability of rare disaster risks for returns 
and volatility in the WTI oil market using a k-th order nonparametric quantile-based 
methodology that allows to capture nonlinear causal effects. Using monthly data on oil returns 
and various disaster risk proxies for the period of 1918:01 to 2013:12, we first show that 
standard linear causality tests yield insignificant results in terms of the predictive power of rare 
disasters over WTI returns. However, additional tests reveal strong evidence of nonlinearity 
and regime changes in the relationship between oil returns and the rare disaster risk proxies, 
indicating that the linear Granger causality test is misspecified, thus the results cannot be relied 
on.  
Applying the nonparametric quantile-causality test, which is robust to misspecification due 
to nonlinearity and structural breaks, we show that rare disaster risk proxies strongly predict 
both returns and volatility for oil, with stronger causal effects observed at the lower ends of 
their respective conditional distributions. We argue that rare disaster risks potentially 
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contribute to jump risk in oil returns (more significantly to negative jumps in this case) that has 
been documented in several previous studies (Larsson and Nossman, 2011;  Christoffersen et 
al., 2016; and Baum and Zerilli, 2016). The findings also suggest that the effect of oil price 
shocks on stock market return dynamics could partially be channelled via the time-variation in 
disaster risk probabilities that commonly affects both the stock and oil price processes. 
From the perspective of an academic, our results tend to suggest that the WTI market 
cannot be categorized as weakly efficient. Furthermore, the finding of strong asymmetric 
causal effects on oil returns, particularly at low quantiles, suggests that models of jump risk as 
well as jump diffusion models with stochastic volatility for crude oil dynamics can be improved 
by integrating proxies of rare disaster risks. From a pricing perspective, following the evidence 
by Christoffersen et al. (2016) that jumps command a premium in crude oil derivatives prices, 
our findings suggest that rare disaster risk proxies can be integrated in pricing models in order 
to improve forecasting models for crude oil prices.   
From a policy making perspective, considering the suggestion by Barro, (2006, 2009), 
Gourio (2012) and Wachter (2013) that if uncertainty regarding the probability and size of 
disasters leads to a great deal of uncertainty in terms of investment growth or consumption 
patterns, the strong evidence of a rare disaster effect on crude oil return and volatility suggests 
that policy makers who are worried about the potential negative impact of oil price fluctuations 
on the real economy should build rare disaster risk proxies into their forecasting models. Given 
that time varying disaster risks affect risk and return dynamics in both the stock and oil market, 
one can argue that disaster risks represent a component of uncertainty that relates to the real 
economy, either via investment or aggregate consumption patterns. It would thus make sense 
to supplement forecasting models for the real economy with proxies of rare disaster risks. This 
is particularly important given the evidence in the paper that causal effects are especially strong 
at the lower quantiles of the conditional distribution of oil returns. However, it must be noted 
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that nonlinearity and possible structural breaks must be taken into account in order to correctly 
capture the effect of rare disaster risks on oil returns as our results show that using a linear 
model is likely to lead to incorrect inferences.  
Overall, our results highlight the importance of testing for nonlinearity and structural 
changes, and if it exists, use a data-driven nonlinear approach to analyze causal relationships. 
The results also highlight the importance of having a nonlinear pricing framework that 
integrates disaster risks in the pricing model, perhaps via models that utilize higher order 
moments. As part of future research, it would be interesting to extend our analysis to a 
forecasting exercise, as in Bonaccolto et al. (2018), since in-sample predictability does not 
guarantee the same over- and out-of-sample.    
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Figure 1(a). Monthly Oil Returns 
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Figure 1(b). Histogram and Summary Statistics for Monthly Oil Returns 
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Figure 1(c). Rare Disaster Risks 
  
  
  
  
 
Note: Violent Break includes all the crisis that starts with violent act; Violent crisis includes all the crisis that 
comprises either serious clashes or full scale war; War includes all the crisis that involves full-scale wars; Grave 
Threat involves all crisis that involves grave value threats; Protracted includes all the crisis with protracted 
conflict, protracted and crisis outside this conflict; Major Power includes the crisis only if at least one superpower 
or great power is there in both side of conflict; Crisis Severity Index summarizes different aspects of crisis 
severity into one measure by aggregating the six variables above; All corresponds to the sum of the numbers 
involved in the six types of crises, i.e., All Crises. 
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Table 1. Linear Granger Causality Test for WTI Returns. 
Predictor Variable F-stat p-value 
All 0.248 0.619 
Violent 0.257 0.612 
War 0.393 0.531 
Violent Break 0.657 0.418 
Protracted 0.187 0.665 
Major Power 0.130 0.719 
Grave Threat 3.681 0.055 
Crisis Severity Index 1.375 0.241 
Note: The null hypothesis is that a specific rare disaster-risk does not affect WTI returns. 
 
 
Table 2. Brock et al. (1996) (BDS) Test of Nonlinearity. 
Predictor Variable Dimension 
2 3 4 5 6 
All 11.930*** 14.668*** 16.648*** 18.965*** 22.139*** 
Violent 11.800*** 14.612*** 16.711*** 19.048*** 22.215*** 
War 11.955*** 14.705*** 16.867*** 19.189*** 22.293*** 
Violent Break 11.968*** 14.667*** 16.744*** 19.056*** 22.144*** 
Protracted 11.861*** 14.694*** 16.813*** 19.114*** 22.287*** 
Major Power 11.599*** 14.351*** 16.516*** 18.849*** 21.986*** 
Grave Threat 12.159*** 14.753*** 16.772*** 19.101*** 22.181*** 
Crisis Severity Index 11.918*** 14.654*** 16.639*** 18.967*** 22.053*** 
Notes: The table reports the z-statistic of the BDS test corresponding to the null of i.i.d. residuals, with the test 
applied to the residuals recovered from the oil returns equation used to test linear Granger causality. *** 
indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1 per cent level of significance. 
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Table 3. Causality-in-Quantiles Test for WTI Returns and Volatility (Squared Returns). 
 Panel A: Returns 
Quantile All Violent War 
Violent 
Break Protracted Major Power 
Grave 
Threat 
Crisis Severity 
Index 
0.1 7.2167*** 5.9849*** 5.4766*** 5.7708*** 7.7755*** 6.1204*** 5.4457*** 6.9386*** 
0.2 19.5019*** 17.1903*** 14.4331*** 15.7936*** 19.2176*** 14.8955*** 14.3119*** 18.6151*** 
0.3 279.2003*** 238.5665*** 208.7500*** 213.8353*** 243.1471*** 210.4238*** 217.6757*** 275.6247*** 
0.4 173.4119*** 149.0373*** 129.4330*** 132.5578*** 152.2913*** 130.6833*** 135.0629*** 171.4894*** 
0.5 102.5227*** 88.6373*** 76.3466*** 78.2232*** 91.2805*** 77.2979*** 79.6206*** 101.6765*** 
0.6 53.6906*** 47.1067*** 40.0197*** 40.8640*** 48.9061*** 40.7026*** 41.6172*** 53.5231*** 
0.7 29.0606*** 25.8022*** 21.5436*** 22.6722*** 27.0010*** 22.1472*** 22.6865*** 29.3225*** 
0.8 16.1053*** 14.5167*** 11.7761*** 12.5703*** 14.7595*** 12.0140*** 12.2454*** 16.1916*** 
0.9 5.7863*** 5.2800*** 4.1152*** 4.6741*** 5.3899*** 4.4439*** 4.3940*** 6.1935*** 
 Panel B: Volatility (Square Returns) 
Quantile All Violent War 
Violent 
Break Protracted Major Power 
Grave 
Threat 
Crisis Severity 
Index 
0.1 631.1909*** 539.6444*** 466.3895*** 481.3387*** 556.0854*** 473.1998*** 478.6326*** 621.0273*** 
0.2 349.2724*** 299.6418*** 257.6132*** 265.9864*** 309.8051*** 261.8596*** 263.9420*** 344.0051*** 
0.3 213.4727*** 184.0816*** 157.0160*** 162.3453*** 191.2074*** 160.1548*** 160.6011*** 210.5786*** 
0.4 128.8988*** 111.9472*** 94.5197*** 97.7984*** 117.1264*** 96.8104*** 96.3064*** 127.4379*** 
0.5 72.3227*** 63.5989*** 52.7842*** 54.7027*** 67.3249*** 54.5118*** 53.4791*** 71.7795*** 
0.6 34.3296*** 30.9207*** 24.9338*** 25.8610*** 33.5145*** 26.2367*** 24.9599*** 34.3277*** 
0.7 24.7935*** 23.1330*** 18.1842*** 19.5660*** 25.7776*** 18.3414*** 18.3407*** 24.8117*** 
0.8 14.1292*** 13.3836*** 10.1449*** 11.2249*** 14.9017*** 10.3858*** 10.2733*** 14.1644*** 
0.9 6.0922*** 5.5954*** 4.2872*** 4.9774*** 6.3375*** 4.5782*** 4.3707*** 6.4134*** 
Note: Entries correspond to the quantile causality test statistic for the null hypothesis that various disaster risk dummies (in separate 
columns) does not Granger cause oil returns and volatility; ***, **, * indicates rejection of null of no-causality at 1, 5, and 10 percent 
levels respectively. 
29 
 
Table 4. Causality-in-Quantiles Test for GARCH(1,1)-based WTI Volatility Estimates. 
 Volatility (GARCH (1,1) Model-Based) 
Quantile All Violent War 
Violent 
Break Protracted 
Major 
Power 
Grave 
Threat 
Crisis Severity 
Index 
0.1 5.2345*** 4.3334*** 4.0593*** 4.2123*** 4.7818*** 4.3514*** 4.1827*** 5.1350*** 
0.2 8.4311*** 6.5370*** 6.2099*** 6.4308*** 6.4431*** 6.4207*** 7.2190*** 8.2695*** 
0.3 5.0632*** 4.4685*** 4.2592*** 4.2502*** 3.9384*** 4.0504*** 4.8567*** 5.0498*** 
0.4 3.6314*** 3.7429*** 4.5695*** 4.1455*** 4.3216*** 4.6548*** 2.7718*** 3.8262*** 
0.5 2.5816*** 2.6178*** 4.0084*** 5.3662*** 4.1678*** 6.0842*** 1.7399* 2.8590*** 
0.6 2.2468** 2.0950** 1.5835 4.7149*** 2.4144** 2.1570** 1.9013* 1.9956** 
0.7 5.7037*** 6.1404*** 3.9138*** 9.6417*** 8.8365*** 7.0366*** 4.3595*** 5.2521*** 
0.8 6.3596*** 6.6967*** 5.2354*** 5.1396*** 6.6526*** 6.1611*** 5.0586*** 6.0322*** 
0.9 4.6533*** 4.0788*** 3.4723*** 3.4463*** 4.2418*** 3.6229*** 3.5172*** 4.4707*** 
Note: Entries correspond to the quantile causality test statistic for the null hypothesis that various disaster risk dummies (in separate 
columns) does not Granger cause GARCH-based oil volatility; ***, **, * indicates rejection of null of no-causality at 1, 5, and 10 percent 
levels respectively. 
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Table 5. Causality-in-Quantiles Test for WTI Returns and Volatility Based on the Monthly Counts of Rare Disaster Risks over Different Phases. 
   Panel A: Returns 
   Quantile 
   0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Predictor 
Variable 
All 
Start 5.17*** 12.97*** 
206.52**
* 
127.35**
* 
74.60**
* 
38.54**
* 
20.37**
* 
12.29**
* 
4.14**
* 
During 3.71*** 9.65*** 
142.82**
* 88.94*** 
52.90**
* 
28.30**
* 
15.63**
* 9.38*** 
3.47**
* 
End 5.16*** 13.84*** 
210.58**
* 
130.65**
* 
77.07**
* 
40.43**
* 
21.20**
* 
11.41**
* 
4.07**
* 
Violent 
Start 5.62*** 14.16*** 
241.88**
* 
149.40**
* 
87.77**
* 
45.59**
* 
24.38**
* 
14.60**
* 
4.83**
* 
During 4.67*** 10.65*** 
168.35**
* 
105.30**
* 
63.13**
* 
34.19**
* 
18.96**
* 
10.52**
* 
3.82**
* 
End 6.07*** 16.01*** 
246.15**
* 
152.86**
* 
90.60**
* 
47.77**
* 
25.84**
* 
13.93**
* 
5.23**
* 
War 
Start 6.37*** 16.41*** 
261.47**
* 
161.34**
* 
94.61**
* 
49.04**
* 
26.42**
* 
15.16**
* 
5.11**
* 
During 5.54*** 12.49*** 
187.79**
* 
115.55**
* 
67.53**
* 
34.85**
* 
18.86**
* 
10.34**
* 
3.55**
* 
End 6.75*** 17.14*** 
270.59**
* 
168.06**
* 
99.51**
* 
52.36**
* 
28.50**
* 
15.58**
* 
5.46**
* 
Violent 
Break 
Start 5.92*** 15.36*** 
255.08**
* 
158.01**
* 
93.13**
* 
48.54**
* 
26.28**
* 
15.51**
* 
5.23**
* 
During 5.26*** 12.47*** 
189.42**
* 
117.48**
* 
69.50**
* 
36.53**
* 
19.39**
* 
11.00**
* 
4.18**
* 
End 6.22*** 16.12*** 
250.39**
* 
154.81**
* 
90.63**
* 
46.93**
* 
24.08**
* 
13.26**
* 
4.66**
* 
Protracted 
Start 5.81*** 14.81*** 
226.87**
* 
139.41**
* 
81.20**
* 
41.56**
* 
21.84**
* 
12.59**
* 
4.32**
* 
During 4.14*** 10.30*** 
150.53**
* 91.90*** 
53.22**
* 
27.27**
* 
14.72**
* 8.57*** 
3.04**
* 
End 5.68*** 14.78*** 
232.08**
* 
143.77**
* 
84.50**
* 
44.17**
* 
23.20**
* 
12.29**
* 
4.49**
* 
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Major Power 
Start 6.29*** 16.84*** 
248.50**
* 
152.70**
* 
88.95**
* 
45.57**
* 
24.34**
* 
13.95**
* 
4.52**
* 
During 4.86*** 12.15*** 
187.87**
* 
115.20**
* 
66.10**
* 
34.25**
* 
18.69**
* 
11.33**
* 
3.50**
* 
End 6.39*** 16.41*** 
252.58**
* 
156.41**
* 
92.24**
* 
48.29**
* 
25.90**
* 
14.49**
* 
4.99**
* 
Grave Threat 
Start 6.58*** 16.14*** 
238.91**
* 
146.58**
* 
85.11**
* 
43.24**
* 
22.76**
* 
12.85**
* 
4.54**
* 
During 5.65*** 13.34*** 
186.14**
* 
115.84**
* 
68.83**
* 
36.40**
* 
18.83**
* 
10.59**
* 
3.47**
* 
End 6.38*** 16.54*** 
247.64**
* 
153.62**
* 
90.83**
* 
47.65**
* 
25.23**
* 
13.49**
* 
4.82**
* 
Crisis 
Severity 
Start 4.83*** 11.68*** 
195.72**
* 
120.57**
* 
70.60**
* 
36.41**
* 
19.13**
* 
12.07**
* 
3.80**
* 
During 4.22*** 9.47*** 
125.33**
* 77.13*** 
45.62**
* 
24.41**
* 
13.57**
* 7.91*** 
3.25**
* 
End 4.63*** 12.25*** 
197.64**
* 
122.34**
* 
71.89**
* 
37.61**
* 
19.34**
* 
10.47**
* 
3.79**
* 
   Panel B: Volatility  (Squared Returns) 
   Quantile 
   0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Predictor 
Variable 
All 
Start 460.64*** 
253.44**
* 
153.52**
* 91.71*** 
50.61**
* 
23.46**
* 
16.89**
* 9.74*** 
4.14**
* 
During 318.95*** 
177.12**
* 
109.04**
* 66.53*** 
38.06**
* 
18.99**
* 
13.34**
* 7.51*** 
3.19**
* 
End 464.36*** 
256.65**
* 
156.36**
* 94.21*** 
52.72**
* 
25.10**
* 
17.69**
* 9.16*** 
3.84**
* 
Violent 
Start 533.50*** 
293.43**
* 
177.49**
* 
105.90**
* 
58.29**
* 
26.90**
* 
19.11**
* 
10.38**
* 
4.19**
* 
During 368.64*** 
204.32**
* 
125.42**
* 76.31*** 
43.49**
* 
21.67**
* 
15.43**
* 8.56*** 
3.52**
* 
End 542.76*** 
300.08**
* 
182.74**
* 
110.15**
* 
61.64**
* 
29.21**
* 
21.14**
* 
11.33**
* 
4.51**
* 
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War 
Start 580.97*** 
319.76**
* 
194.02**
* 
115.89**
* 
63.91**
* 
29.48**
* 
21.51**
* 
11.45**
* 
4.63**
* 
During 414.01*** 
227.38**
* 
137.68**
* 81.95*** 
44.93**
* 
20.61**
* 
14.88**
* 8.04*** 
3.57**
* 
End 589.23*** 
325.07**
* 
197.86**
* 
118.73**
* 
65.95**
* 
30.79**
* 
23.37**
* 
12.58**
* 
5.31**
* 
Violent 
Break 
Start 571.19*** 
315.29**
* 
191.52**
* 
115.01**
* 
63.98**
* 
29.99**
* 
21.38**
* 
12.21**
* 
4.74**
* 
During 417.92*** 
230.68**
* 
140.47**
* 84.42*** 
47.05**
* 
22.22**
* 
16.13**
* 9.33*** 
3.86**
* 
End 557.87*** 
307.69**
* 
186.71**
* 
111.94**
* 
62.10**
* 
28.95**
* 
19.73**
* 
11.05**
* 
4.38**
* 
Protracted 
Start 512.07*** 
281.77**
* 
170.50**
* 
101.78**
* 
56.08**
* 
25.88**
* 
18.24**
* 
10.29**
* 
4.25**
* 
During 333.10*** 
182.56**
* 
110.29**
* 65.59*** 
36.11**
* 
17.04**
* 
12.50**
* 7.11*** 
3.23**
* 
End 509.70*** 
281.32**
* 
170.96**
* 
102.68**
* 
57.12**
* 
26.84**
* 
18.98**
* 9.89*** 
4.26**
* 
Major Power 
Start 556.40*** 
305.64**
* 
184.42**
* 
109.65**
* 
60.03**
* 
27.32**
* 
21.02**
* 
11.69**
* 
4.77**
* 
During 410.01*** 
224.81**
* 
135.80**
* 80.51*** 
43.95**
* 
20.10**
* 
15.43**
* 8.96*** 
3.57**
* 
End 563.43*** 
311.34**
* 
189.40**
* 
113.97**
* 
63.61**
* 
30.05**
* 
22.65**
* 
12.03**
* 
4.82**
* 
Grave Threat 
Start 539.88*** 
296.54**
* 
178.96**
* 
106.40**
* 
58.23**
* 
26.50**
* 
18.10**
* 
10.81**
* 
4.69**
* 
During 424.37*** 
235.69**
* 
144.74**
* 88.17*** 
50.16**
* 
24.56**
* 
17.13**
* 9.03*** 
3.60**
* 
End 555.35*** 
307.41**
* 
187.46**
* 
113.21**
* 
63.58**
* 
30.32**
* 
21.63**
* 
11.09**
* 
4.59**
* 
Crisis 
Severity 
Start 430.87*** 
236.76**
* 
143.01**
* 85.23*** 
46.89**
* 
21.65**
* 
15.72**
* 9.20*** 
4.00**
* 
During 180.39*** 99.54*** 60.71*** 36.81*** 
20.99**
* 
10.80**
* 7.10*** 5.08*** 2.52** 
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End 429.03*** 
236.75**
* 
143.68**
* 86.27*** 
48.03**
* 
22.67**
* 
15.85**
* 8.03*** 
3.16**
* 
Note: Entries correspond to the quantile causality test statistic for the null hypothesis that various disaster risk counts at its start, during 
and end phases does not Granger cause oil returns and volatility; ***, **, * indicates rejection of null of no-causality at 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels respectively. 
 
APPENDIX: 
Table A1. Causality-in-Quantiles Test for WTI Returns and Volatility (Squared Returns) Based on News-Based Measure of Disaster Risks 
(NVIX and Components) 
 Returns 
 Predictor Variable 
Quantile NVIX Government Intermediation 
Natural 
Disaster 
Securities 
Markets War Unclassified 
0.1 6.4206*** 4.9679*** 5.7493*** 4.0758*** 7.1407*** 4.3490*** 5.3588*** 
0.2 12.9224*** 10.6596*** 13.4384*** 10.5224*** 18.0269*** 11.5988*** 11.4614*** 
0.3 23.7779*** 18.0387*** 23.1145*** 19.6249*** 31.0261*** 20.6908*** 21.5147*** 
0.4 102.5567*** 79.8043*** 104.6187*** 106.6468*** 117.4449*** 113.2903*** 100.5753*** 
0.5 61.0115*** 46.5777*** 62.6492*** 60.1245*** 69.6136*** 62.2860*** 58.8065*** 
0.6 32.9857*** 25.2983*** 34.8826*** 29.6699*** 37.4304*** 30.3684*** 30.9819*** 
0.7 20.2650*** 16.9381*** 22.4840*** 19.1358*** 23.3822*** 19.5013*** 19.4769*** 
0.8 11.7443*** 10.1552*** 13.2996*** 10.8269*** 12.8133*** 11.9613*** 11.1295*** 
0.9 4.4747*** 4.4432*** 5.0132*** 4.1819*** 4.9108*** 4.1955*** 4.3027*** 
 Volatility (Squared Returns) 
 Predictor Variable 
Quantile NVIX Government Intermediation 
Natural 
Disaster 
Securities 
Markets War Unclassified 
0.1 45.7090*** 40.9852*** 46.3816*** 125.8735*** 50.9710*** 50.8902*** 45.6798*** 
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0.2 28.1338*** 25.4910*** 28.2832*** 68.6608*** 30.8221*** 29.8482*** 27.9251*** 
0.3 20.6017*** 18.9120*** 20.5306*** 41.6931*** 22.1305*** 20.7916*** 20.2640*** 
0.4 16.5782*** 15.4747*** 16.3745*** 25.5186*** 17.3983*** 15.9446*** 16.1374*** 
0.5 14.2497*** 13.5339*** 13.9418*** 15.0452*** 14.5919*** 13.1595*** 13.7264*** 
0.6 13.1642*** 12.9271*** 13.0136*** 9.5228*** 13.5086*** 12.1310*** 12.6522*** 
0.7 12.0080*** 11.8190*** 11.9256*** 7.5614*** 12.0319*** 11.1460*** 11.3894*** 
0.8 10.2668*** 10.0481*** 9.9955*** 5.0497*** 10.0523*** 9.1129*** 9.8164*** 
0.9 7.3948*** 7.4433*** 7.1194*** 2.8865*** 7.2265*** 6.3844*** 7.1151*** 
Note: Entries correspond to the quantile causality test statistic for the null hypothesis that aggregate and components of news-based 
volatility index (NVIX) does not Granger cause oil returns and volatility; ***, **, * indicates rejection of null of no-causality at 1, 5, and 
10 percent levels respectively. 
 
Table A2. Causality-in-Quantiles Test for WTI Returns and Volatility (Squared Returns) Based on News-Based Measure of Geopolitical Risks  
 Returns 
 Predictor Variable 
Quantile GPR GPR Acts 
GPR 
Threats 
0.1 4.3612*** 4.7848*** 4.6160*** 
0.2 8.8046*** 10.3587*** 9.3838*** 
0.3 15.3373*** 20.1353*** 15.5939*** 
0.4 61.6984*** 86.2895*** 57.5383*** 
0.5 39.8033*** 54.1275*** 37.3023*** 
0.6 24.6144*** 31.7634*** 23.2817*** 
0.7 15.7158*** 20.0685*** 14.9661*** 
0.8 9.5360*** 11.3614*** 8.9023*** 
0.9 4.5662*** 4.6731*** 4.4975*** 
 Volatility (Squared Returns) 
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 Predictor Variable 
Quantile GPR GPR Acts 
GPR 
Threats 
0.1 54.9345*** 78.5399*** 54.8733*** 
0.2 32.3526*** 44.1667*** 32.7087*** 
0.3 22.3492*** 28.6157*** 22.8947*** 
0.4 16.6481*** 19.5465*** 17.3002*** 
0.5 13.2402*** 13.8711*** 13.9309*** 
0.6 11.4198*** 10.5223*** 12.1437*** 
0.7 10.7158*** 10.0206*** 11.0620*** 
0.8 9.0443*** 7.7320*** 9.2269*** 
0.9 6.3694*** 5.5274*** 6.6189*** 
Note: Entries correspond to the quantile causality test statistic for the null hypothesis that aggregate and components of news-based 
geopolitical risks (GPRs) does not Granger cause oil returns and volatility; ***, **, * indicates rejection of null of no-causality at 1, 5, 
and 10 percent levels respectively. 
 
